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Seven years ago, there have been 20 commercial banks in Croatia. They
were owned by big state-owned enterprises, the same enterprises being
the biggest clients of these banks. Lending to related parties and related
moral hazards were not considered to be a systemic problem. On the
contrary; it was a substitute for Soviet-type central planning mechanism,
so thai the scope of banks' business was determined by the ruling
communist party. Structure of the system was dependant on the structure
of political power which was segmented along regional lines. Hence 18
banks were regional banks and 2 of them were nationwide banks.
Instead of relying on highly complex national economic plan, ruling party
controlled economy through control of banks and [heir owners and
clients - largest enterprises. So-called "self-management" socialism was,
in fact, economizing on transaction costs (costs of information processing
and monitoring) in a centralist model which was in essence not a lot
different from other forms of socialism. However, a system was "softer"
than the Soviet-type system, so that two tier banking system was put in
place early, in the fifties.
Since the banking system acted as a main remedy for control over the
economic system, the organization of the economy generated permanent
banking failure. There were no prudential constraints, banks were
systematically and cheaply bailed out through the soft budget constraint
thanks to the generous federal central banking system. Risk was not
considered as a factor of the credit decisions, so banks' portfolios were
highly concentrated and illiquid (financial markets were not allowed to
develop). Incentive of banks' managers was designed in favor of ruling
party's investment plans, so that banks ranked expansion higher than
prudency and soundness.
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Now, seven years later, Croatia has a record of three years of low
inflation, far the lowest among the CEU countries. That was not achieved
by chance. Standard prudential measures were put in place, there are no
guarantees for cheap bailouts. Financial discipline improved, markets
developed and monetary instruments have been adjusted comparable to
developed countries. Central bank, the National Bank of Croatia,
conducts monetary policy mainly by indirect monetary instruments.
Rehabilitation of bad banks is conducted in a credible way which implies
punishments for owners and managers of insolvent banks. Finally, there
were 60 banks operating in Croatia in September 1996, and the large
part of the banking system is controlled by the private sector. Although
share of the private sector is still about 50% in terms of total capital or
assets, it is over 70% measured by newly extended credits. However, this
is a picture of the system in 1996. Till the end of 1995, as bank
rehabilitation lagged behind macroeconomic stabilization, the system was
heavily influenced by problems of the banking sector and interest rates
were increasing.
Croatian experience is interesting in at least three aspects. First, changes
occurred more in evolutionary than in revolutionary way. For example,
some older banks became privatized during the course of time, as
enterprises that owned them became privately owned; many banks
managed to maintain proper capital adequacy in hard times. Second,
Croatian experience shows that ownership concentration matters
regarding banks' performance in the new competitive environment.
Namely, the older and larger banks with lower degrees of ownership
concentration are ready to do business with lower interest spreads, while
newly founded, smaller privately owned banks typically charge higher
interest rates (Sonje, Kraft and Dorsey, 1996) and have more
concentrated ownership structure. This fact is extensively elaborated in
the paper, because it explains why greater number of banks does not
necessarily lead to greater competition in the short-run. And third,
credible rehabilitation of problem banks in Croatia proved to be a
sufficient condition to improve the banking system performance in the
short-run, while new entry of domestic or foreign financial institutions
proves to be the necessary condition for the long-run improvement.
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Croatian experience now allows direct comparison of banking system's
structure and performance prior and after the credible bank rehabilitation
begun, both period being marked with firm macroeconomic stability.
The first section contains basic empirical findings regarding interbank
differences in interest rates policy, impact of bank rehabilitation, impact
of monetary policy and feedback impact of the structure and behavior of
the banking system on monetary policy. The basic finding is that
structural factors such as bank rehabilitation determine the choice of
monetary instruments as well as the scope of monetary management. The
second section provides details on bank rehabilitation, and the third
section provides more details on aggregate banking system behavior
regarding relations among sectors of the national economy.
1. BASIC EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
1.1. Interbank Differences in Interest Rate Policy
Research Department of the National Bank of Croatia submitted a Report
on Interest Rates to the Council of the National Bank of Croatia at the
beginning of 1996 where it states that:
"There is a widespread belief that problem banks have higher costs,
interest spreads and lending interest rates. Generally it is assumed
thai problem banks do business with worse clients in financial
distress who are ready to pay any interest in order to san-ive in the
short-run, without taking care about long-run repayment of the
principal. Our research proved that this belief is wrong. " (p.8).
The same argument is repeated in a recent article by Sonje, Kraft and
Dorsey (1996). Their cross-section regression on individual banks proved
that smaller, newly founded private banks charge higher interest rates and
have larger interest spread. A graphical presentation in support of that
argument is displayed here. Figure 1 is constructed in a following way:
49 banks are ranked in five groups according to the size of assets. The
first group contains nine largest banks in Croatia and makes the bulk of
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the banking system. Two indicators per group are displayed. The first one
is the simple average of ownership concentration (CR4) for banks within
the group- CR4 is the share of four largest individual owners in total
equity capital of the bank. The second indicator is an average of net
interest earnings over total assets for banks within each group.
Figure 1
CR4 AND NET INTEREST EARNINGS OVER ASSETS
FOR FIVE GROUPS OF BANKS RANKED ACCORDING
TO THE SIZE OF TOTAL ASSETS AS OF END 1995
• CR4




Concentration ratio and net interest earnings over assets are the lowest
in the largest group. Both indicators grow as the average size of the bank
in the group becomes smaller. This is not a surprising result. Average size
of the bank in the first group is 6,1 billion Kuna i.e. about 1,7 billion
German marks worth of assets, which is roughly 100 times more than the
average size of the bank in the smallest group. It is 7 times more than the
average size of the banks in the second group (10-19) and 1 7 times more
than the average size in the third group (20-29). Large banks are
generally old banks with more dispersed ownership structure and greater
burden of non-performing assets from the past (there are significant intra-
group differences which will be analyzed below) which tend to influence
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their net interest earnings over assets downwards. Hence average net
interest earnings over total assets are 2,5% in the largest group and 8,7%
in the group of the smallest. Generally, these are newly founded private
banks with much more concentrated ownership structure.
Existing literature offers several explanations for high net interest earnings
over assets in the smallest banks. First, these banks do not have non-
performing loans. Second, a few owners can easily coordinate their
influence over managers' preferences, so that these banks prefer short
term profits over expansion. Third, these are liquid banks which earned
high interest rates on the interbank market (see bellow) by covering
illiquid problem banks. Fourth, these banks are so small that they are
able to position themselves in a specific market environment where
willingness to pay on the demand side is extremely high. Fifth, these
banks do not evaluate risks properly because they are still learning
banking business. Sixth, net interest earnings are high because interest
costs are negligible; loans are financed out of capital. Seventh, risk
component of the interest rale is influential because of imperfect
instruments of collecting claims (slow legal procedures), and it influences
small banks more, because they have less bargaining power and less
experienced lawyers than greater banks.
All explanations are valid since none can be ruled out as impossible.
Indeed, Sonje, Kraft and Dorsey (1996) showed that the sixth explanation
is valid because they calculated capital asset ratio for new private banks
as high as of 42%, and loans over deposits ratio as high as of 242%.
Hence, these banks did not develop retail banking business and a great
number of banks has no real life influence on competition for
households' sector deposits. They lend out of capital, and their role in
the banking system as d whole is still very small. Indeed, banks ranked
from number 1 to number 9 (group 1] comprise 80% of total assets,
while the first two groups (ranks from 1 to 19) comprise 91.5% of total
assets. Hence, number of banks is misleading if used for evaluating
competitive pressures and luckily, any future banking failure that can
occur in the sector of small banks will probably have no negative
systemic impact, at least presently and in the short-run.
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Now we take a look at intragroup characteristics in order to asses
intragroup homogeneity. Figure 2 shows intragroup standard deviations
for indicators presented in Figure 1.
Figure 2
INTRAGROUP STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF OWNERSHIP








1-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49
group rank
Again, intragroup homogeneity gets lower as the size of the banks gets
smaller. The smaller the banks are, the more different their ownership
and performance is. Smaller banks are less capable to respond to
idiosyncratic shocks, so that negative shocks in small individual markets
influence higher intragroup variability of performance. Hence, vast
majority of banking institutions (30 - 40 in number) belong to smaller
groups which presently record high earnings. They are subject to strong
influence of concentrated owners who are probably myopic in a sense
that they strongly prefer short term profits over reinvestment of profits,
expansion and survival in the long-run.
This conclusion is confirmed by the cross section regression estimates of
net interest earnings over assets (NIEA) as dependent variable on
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ownership concentration and size of assets as independent variables for
a sample of 49 banks ([-statistics in parenthesis):
NIEA = 3.7132 + 0.0513CR4 - 0.0231A
(3026) (2.481) (-1.516)
Ownership concentration is a significant explanation of interbank
variability of net interest earnings over assets, while size of the bank is
only a marginally significant explanation. Higher ownership
concentration leads to higher net interest earnings over assets.
1.2. IMPACT OF (LATE) BANK REHABILITATION
As already notified, differences in groups' net interest earnings may also
be due to strong negative impact of non-performing assets in older and
larger banks, as well as due to high earnings of smaller liquid banks who
extended interbank loans at high rates to illiquid, on average older and
bigger banks. Test of this hypothesis is presented in this subsection.
Four Urge banks are considered to be the problem banks in Croatia.
During 1994 and 1995 these banks systemalically recorded negative cash
flow and generated demand a! the interbank money market. Moreover,
they generated interest rate inelastic demand for money market funds
because they were ready to pay high interest rate in order to maintain
daily operations. The central bank was not bailing them out directly,
because these banks could draw only interventive loans from the
National Bank of Croatia with high penalty interest rate (above market
rates). While using the loan, the bank's account is blocked, as well as
accounts of its clients, so that problem banks tended to avoid this
window. Other banks were ready to cover problem banks' daily minuses
because they were considered to be to big to fail, and obligatory reserves
deposits at the central bank were used as collateral for interbank loans
(the collateral was abolished in September 1996). Hence, the system was
avoiding cheap bailout either directly from the governmenl or indirectly
via central bank, so that there was no direct monetization of losses that
could jeopardize stability of exchange rates and prices. However, liquid
commercial banks were ready to supporl problem banks because they
could earn high interest with low risk. Hence interest rates were
persistently high, and restructuring of problem banks and problem cl ients
slow till spring 1996, when credible rehabilitation begun.
If this is correct, than a binary variable which equals one for problem
banks and zero otherwise (PROBLEM) should be a significant explanation
of variability of net interest earnings over assets. Its expected sign is
negative, because problem banks are expected to have low NIEA due to
high interest costs for interbank loans.
Binary variable PROBLEM equals one six times. Besides four banks that
are publicly announced to be subject to rehabilitation, two more banks
that often recorded minuses in 1994 and 1995 are included. One
additional bank is from the group of top nine, and another one is from
the second group (10-19).The result is (t-statistics in parenthesis):
NIEA = 4 1534 + 0.0479CR4 - 0.0001A - 3 8659PROBLEM
(3.469) (2.405) (-0.559) (-2 177)
Sign and significance of the parameter with binary variable expectedly
show that problem banks on average have 3.9% lower net interest
earnings over assets than the entire population of banks. The hypothesis
is confirmed. Moreover, it shows that it is exactly these problem banks,
overburdened with non-performing assets, thai influenced significance of
assets parameter in equation presented in section 1.1. When variable
PROBLEM is included, it appears that larger banks in terms of assets, on
average, do not have lower spreads.
However, conclusion holds only ceteris paribus. The method applied
does not allow for assessment of dynamk: effects such as effects of
credible bank rehabilitation on stronger competition. As documented
bellow, the dynamic effects have been at work since the end of 1995,
when credible rehabilitation begun. The next section shows how bank
rehabilitation opened room for big changes in monetary instruments,
which induced sharp drop in money market interest rate.
PRIVREDNA KHEIAN|A I EKONOMSKA POLITIKA r •y
1.3. IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY AND FEEDBACK IMPACTS
OF THE BANKING SYSTEM ON MONETARY POLICY
National Bank of Croatia increased money supply mainly by foreign
exchange interventions since 1993. Presently, internalioru! reserves
comprise more than 95% of its assets, and gross international reserves of
the central bank increased roughly 400% since the beginning of
stabilization in October 1993. Since foreign exchange inflows were
strung, as in other advanced transition economies, the central bank used
several sterilization techniques in order to maintain price stability. Choice
of instruments was limited by the structure and performance of the
banking system.
High and rigid money market interest rates complicated the sterilization
problem. Growth of money supply did not influence money market
interest rate downwards because problem banks absorbed free excess
reserves of good banks, no matter the high interest rates. However, any
indirect instrumenl of sterilization had to take into account the height of
money market rates. Market mechanism did not work if interest offered
for rhe indirect sterilization instrument was significantly below money
market rale. On the other hand, high interest offered on T-bills or NBC-
bills1 implied high fiscal costs of sterilization. Hence the National Bank
of Croatia relied heavily on raising obligatory reserves requirements
(Figure 3). It tried to offset opportunity costs for good banks by raising the
rate of remuneration on reserves.
1 These are Iwo main indirect instruments of domestic monetary policy. T-bills are not
effective yet, because the market started to develop only in 1 Olfi and ( omprises 30% of
the NBC! bills market, measured by the volume of outstanding papers. N BC bill is a short
term central bank paper denominated in domestic currency with maturities of 35 and 91
day. Bills are regularly auctioned on Wednesday, they are freely traded at the secondary
niarkei, and commercial banks can use them as a collateral for setting the central bank's
lombard loan. National Bank of Croatia enioys discretion in choosing both the volume
and the interest rate at each auction, so that it can easily achieve targeted level of
sterilizalion. On the other hand, by choosing interest rate, it can influenre the market
interest rate. This is a flexible way to control money supply in periods when sterilization
is of primary importance, but it also allows !o influence interest rates when sterilization
becomes of secondary importance.
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Until spring 1996 rehabilitation of three out of four problem banks
started. These three banks generated more than half of the demand for
money market funds in 1994 and 1995, and suddenly the demand
disappeared as rehabilitation begun. Sharp drop of money market interest
rate started (oo (mmr in Figure 3). Monetary policy makers found
themselves in a position to influence the money market rates and use
indirect instruments of monetary policy. Figure 3 clearly shows the shift
from direct to indirect instruments by comparing the rate of reserve
requirements (rr) with the share of NBC bills in Ml (b/ml). The biggest
increase in the rate of reserve requirements was recorded during 1995,
while a significant drop of share of NBC bills outstanding in M1 was
recorded in the same period. In the post-rehabilitation period of 1996 !he
dynamics is inverted: rate of reserve requirements is decreasing, while
the share of NBC bills in Ml is increasing. Hence, money market interest
rate does not seem to be sensitive to monetary policy stance itself (i.e. on
the scope and size of sterilization) which did not change significantly
since late 1993. It appears to be sensitive to the combination of. the
sterilization instruments. Since the combination of direct and indirect
instruments depends on structural factors, i.e. on a pace of bank
rehabilitation, interest rates in general are predominantly influenced by
structural factors at work in the banking system.
The following regression confirms the verbal argument, although it calls
for further econometric refinement. Money market rate is dependent
variable, and an artificial variable constructed as a ratio of rr over b/m1
is independent variable. When monetary authorities rely more on direct
instrument, it goes up and vice versa. Hence the expected sign of that
variable labeled R is positive, and it reflects the room left for monetary
instruments reforms, given the pace and scope of bank rehabilitation. Any
decrease in value of R (relying more on indirect instrument) pulls the
money market interest rate down and vice versa.
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Figure 3
RATE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS (RR), MONEY MARKET
INTEREST RATE (MMR) AND SHARE OF NBC BILLS OUTSTANDING























Results are estimated from May 1994 to August 1996. Direct impact of
R is 0.46 in two periods, but it also has a prolonged dynamic impact via
lagged effect of money market rate. Hence this equation helps to explain
events in 1996 in Croatia (t-statistics in parenthesis):
mmr t = 0.76001mmr ,., + 0.19672R, 0.270189R
(5.274} (1.703) (2.285)
R'adj = 0.925 Dh = 6.7
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2. BANK REHABILITATION AND COMPETITION:
SHORT-RUN VS. LONG-RUN
Bank rehabilitation is a key to understanding events in 1996. Its lagging
behind macroeconomic stabilization in 1994 and 1995 is also a key to
understanding financial developments in these years. Why does it play
a key role?
2.1. BANK REHABILITATION IN THE SHORT-RUN
First, rehabilitation starts with a liquidity injection from the government.
At the very beginning of the process, when old managers leave and new
ones are appointed by the state Agency, the bank gets a cash injection
so that new management has only to maintain liquidity and devote their
scarce organizational resources and time to solving deeper problems of
soundness and solvency. So, any immediate short term systemic danger
coming from the problem bank is eliminated at the beginning.
Up to now, cash injections have been given to three big banks which
are, or have been, in the process of rehabilitation. Their illiquidity had
strong adverse systemic effects as pointed out in section 1.3., because
these banks comprise 17.4% of total assets of the banking system. After
elimination of their illiquidity, which pushed the money market rates up
and influenced their rigidity downwards, the central bank properly-
adjusted instruments and improved financial performance of the system.
Hence the beginning of rehabilitation had a strong impact in the short-
run due to liquidity improvements.
Second, rehabilitation implies a change in the ownership structure. It is
a threat to owners who may resume huge capital losses if the bank is not
properly run. Namely, new management and the government's Agency
(with a help from the Supervision Department of the National Bank of
Croatia) estimate bad claims and write them off against guarantee capital
(tier 1 + tier 2). Then, a bank is recapitalized if needed, by government
bonds. Solvency improves on the assets side, and ownership structure
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changes on the liabilities side in favor of the government Agency
proportionally to its cash and bond injections.
It is important to note that presently it does not mean transfer of
ownership from the private to the slate sector. In other words, it is not a
typical stale intervention in functioning of private markets in order to
correct private banking failure. More precisely, Croatian type of bank
rehabilitation means consolidation of financial relations and political
powers within the state sector as a first step towards privatization of the
bank. As big old banks were owned mainly by large state owned
companies2, rehabilitation implies a shift of ownership from state owned
enterprises and agencies towards the Agency for rehabilitation which has
a legal obligation lo privatize the bank in the second step. This model is
well designed for Croatian institutional environment because it
recognizes the legacy of the past in the form of tight links between banks
and enterprises that have been established in the period of so-called "self-
management". It offers an "exit" mechanism for banks that are not able
to evolve normally in the period of rise of private markets and
institutions. Other old banks, which are able to privatize themselves
indirectly through privatization of owners or issues of new or treasurers'
shares, and which remain liquid and sound, evolve without external
institutional shocks possibly coming from the state intervention. Indeed,
Croatian banking system offers some success stories in this respect.3 So,
only if old bank fails to adjust to the new environment, rehabilitation
provides the exit by breaking links between old management and old
state owned enterprises. It is done fast, so that it also works in the short-
run, while effects of privatization of rehabilitated bank occur in the long-
run.
; Refer to introduction.
! The second Croatian bank by size of capital and assets (which is the first by deposit
base, newly extended loans and share in the foreign exchange market) is considered to
be 2/3ds in private hands, including foreign owners. This bank is listed among lop five
emerging markets banks. At least half of equity is held by privatized enterprises, and the
remaining part of private ownership is in hands of US portfolio investors. Moreover, the
strongest medium size bank in Croatia managed to attract one big European bank as a
strategic investor in its new equity.
Third, rehabilitation is a behavioral externality that imposes threat to all
banks. It improves strength of self-enforcing prudential constraints. So,
besides liquidity and solvency, rehabilitation influences prudence and
soundness in general, which can also help to explain recent events in
Croatian financial system, because it has very short term effects. Namely,
every owner and banker who sees owners and managers in other old
banks loosing their shares and positions, naturally thinks of how to
improve bank's reserve position in order to avoid painful exit from the
business. Since rehabilitation in Croatia occurred as a one-shoot shock
in Spring this year, other bankers eagerly started to look for additional
reserves in order to improve soundness of the business. One obvious
way to improve soundness in the short-run is to accumulate risk free
government papers, especially if they can be used as collateral in the
interbank deals. The other way which is less obvious and pays off in the
long-run is to invest in screening and monitoring of clients. According to
Berglof and Roland (1996), the two can be viewed as substitutes. In other
words, it is much easier to invest "a million" in government risk free
papers which bear high interest and can be used as collateral, than to
invest "a million" in staff, knowledge and equipment for screening and
monitoring clients. The first strategy pays off in the short-run, the second
in the long-run; since rehabilitation has a short- run impact as a
behavioral externality, other bankers prefer government papers. This is
exactly what has happened in Croatia and enabled central bank to drive
the interest rates down.
Contrary to widespread opinions that emphasize the long-run impacts of
bank rehabilitation, Croatian experience shows its short-run potential
which can exhibit strong impact on interest rates comparable to an
impact of a stabilization program on exchange rate and prices. Banks in
rehabilitation are put in a position of shock, liquidity and solvency are
reestablished fast, and negative externality of problem banks' illiquidity
is been substituted by a positive behavioral externality. What will happen
later, in the long-run, depends on numerous factors which only partly
depend on rehabilitation.
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2.2. THE LONG-RUN
Identity and structure of new owners i.e. the speed of privatization of
rehabilitated banks, and personality and background of new managers
undoubtedly are long-run determinants of behavior of individual banks.
However, there are other determinants outside rehabilitation process
itself which are probably more important in the long-run. The resl of the
section is devoted to two such examples.
In the first section we saw that ownership matters. Number of banks is
misleading as a measure of competition, because 30-40 banks in Croalia
are small banks with concentrated ownership structures that favor short
term profits over long-run expansion. Competitive and contestable
pressures are still weak. Hence there is no external enforcement, except
ownership pressure, which can prevent rehabilitated bank to become
problem bank again. Ownership pressure itself can prevent getting into
problems again, but it does not provide a guarantee for achievement of
social optimum in the banking sector. The present situation clearly points
into this direction. New private owners of rehabilitated banks will act as
any other private owners, and they may exploit market imperfections to
extract rents. Competition is the only vehicle which can simultaneously
ensure both internal efficiency and social optimum reflected in interest
rates comparable to those in the developed countries. And it does not
have a lot to do with rehabilitation in the long-run. Easy entry and
openness to foreign competition are necessary conditions for the long-run
success. Luckily, Croatian regulations stick to this rule.
The other example is related to the above mentioned decision between
investment in government papers and screening & monitoring clients. It
is obviously crucial for the future of the bank regardless of its size,
ownership structure and manager's personality. However, this choice is
influenced by long term macroeconomic considerations related to capital
inflows and fiscal deficit. If net capital inflows is strong for a few years,
monetary authorities will try to sterilize domestic monetary effects of
interventions at the foreign exchange market. They will continuously
offer short term risk free papers to the markets, and bankers will probably
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prefer these easy earnings as long as the interest earned is higher than the
cost of collecting deposits. The same effect can be induced by
persistently high fiscal deficit which is financed by domestic banks.
Ministry of Finance would continuously offer T-bills at the market, and
bankers can earn fair interest higher than the cost of collecting deposits.
Hence there is the danger of renewing the old links between banking
sector and the state sector in another form.
3. ORIENTATION OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
I conclude by examining relations among the banking system and other
sectors of the economy. Changes in directions of inter-sectoral flows are
expected in times when everything is changing, especially in financial
sector. Stability of exchange rate and aggregate and relative prices,
growing importance of newly extended loans by the private banking
sector, introduction of sound fiscal principles and new financing
instruments, rapidly changing ownership structures and rehabilitation of
problem banks; all of this must have had sorne influence on decisions
and flows. The question is: can we identify sectors that are attracting
flows from the banking system; is there a danger of a new domination of
the state sector? In order to answer these questions, half-year data on
consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks starting in end 1993 is
presented in the appendix.
Figure 4 depicts main changes. Share of the claims on government in
total assets decreased sharply, from 39,3% to 22,7%. All other items
benefitted: reserves at the centra! bank increased from 1,7% to 5,1%;
foreign assets from 17,1% to 19,3%, claims on enterprises from 38,1%
to 45,3% and claims on households from 3,8% to 7,4%. Crowing share
of reserves at the central bank is justifiable because of fast growth of the
share of money in liabilities. In other words, liabilities are relatively more
liquid than in end 1993. Crowing share of foreign assets can also be
justified. Although foreign liabilities are declining, the main reason for
growth of share of money in total liabilities is to be found in the fast
growth of foreign exchange deposits. Hence, having more foreign assets
is a pruden! behavior.
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Figure 4
SHARES OF MAIN ASSET ITEMS IN TOTAL ASSETS
OF COMMERCIAL BANKS - HALF YEAR DATA -
CTl35
• Claims on Gvt.
H Claims on Ent.








Source: Author's calculations based on NBC Bulletin.
All of the above mentioned factors contributed to the shift from financing
government towards financing enterprises and households. Besides, the
quality of credits improved within all sectors.
Lending to households is still al a relatively low level, so that there is
high qualily demand at the market which still has not been satisfied. The
rate of default is at minimum because banks are extending loans to
households with multiple collateral. Typically, these are mortgage loans
which are additionally collateralized by a deposit in an amount of one
quarter to one third of the amount of the loan. Long term lending to
households is expected to grow rapidly in the near future, as banks are
now able to raise long-term funds from abroad to finance these loans.
The domestic funds are the only limit to the development of lending to
households, because there are no long-term savings.
Lending to enterprises grow at the highest rate, but quality of claims is
improving because of limits on credits to the largest loss makers. These
limits were imposed in mid 1994. Still, collection of claims remains a
problem because credible bankruptcy law which will speed up slow
judicial procedures will become effective in Idnuary 1997. Hence there
is a danger that part of growth is due to capitalization of interest.
The structure of lending to government improved, because non-
marketable instruments are replaced with marketable ones. Far the
greatest share of it are bonds issued as a counterpart to blocked foreign
exchange savings accumulated during the period of former Yugoslavia.
This is still nonmarketable instrument with dubious debt service. Ministry
of Finance recently issued 3-year marketable bonds in order to refinance
part of principal and interest that became due, and it announced that
starting from end 1996 it will service due debt in cash.
Therefore, both macroeconomic regulations (monetary policy reflected
in stable exchange rate and prices, fiscal and foreign exchange policy)
and microeconomic ones (reforms of monetary instruments, bank
rehabilitation and prudential measures) significantly improved
performance of the banking system and set the terrain for financial
deepening.
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APPENDIX
DMB'S CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
IN MILLION OF KUNA
ASSETS
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